UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-19-2011

Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass'n v. Allen Appellant's Brief
Dckt. 37972

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass'n v. Allen Appellant's Brief Dckt. 37972" (2011). Not Reported. 50.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/50

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

David Bruce Allen
Sandpoint, near [83864]
State of Idaho
Appearing at all times In Propria Persona

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Federal National Mortgage Assoc.,
a.k.a. FAI'\/'NIE MAE, a corp.
created by Congress of the United
States

)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff/Respondent, )
)
vs.
)
)
David B. Allen, an individual; and )
)
DOES I through X, unknown
occupants of the property commonly)
knows as 1596 E. Shingle Mill
)
Road, Sandpoint, Bonner County, )
Idaho.
)
)
Defendants/Appellants. )
____________ )

Sup.Ct. No. 37972-2010
Bonner Case No. CV-2009-1865

APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT OF
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR
COUNTY OF BONNER
THE HONORABLE STEVEN YERBY PRESIDING
Attorney For Appellant:

Mr. David Bruce Allen
In Propria Persona

Sandpoint, near [83864]
State of Idaho
Attorney of Respondents:

Mark D. Perison, Bar No. 4804
MARK D. PERISON, P.A.
314 South 9th Street, Suite 300
Boise, near [83707]
State of Idaho

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents ................................................................................................... .
Table of Cases and Authorities.............................................................

11

Statement of the case ........................................................................ .
.Attorney Fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

Argument with Questions Presented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...

5

Substitution Issue of Attorneys.................................................................................

12

Does Federal National Mortgage Association have standing? .................................

19

First l'vfotion to Vacate ... ....... .......... ........................... ........................... ..... ...............

26

Second Motion to Vacate Judgment .................................................................... ... ..

31

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

35

Page i

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

CASES
Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Piper,
133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999)................................................
Baldwin v. Baldwin, 114 Idaho

P.2d 1244 (Ct.App. 1988).

32
30

Beach Lateral Water Users Association v. Harrison.
142Jdaho600, 603, 130P.3d1138, 1141 (2006). ......................................

5

Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571,212 P.3d 1001 (2009) ..........................................

16

Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. La11nnce.
143 ldaho 704, 707, 152 P.3d 575, 578 (2007)............................................

5

Cowan v. Board ofComm'rs, 143 Idaho 501, 510, 148 P.3d 1247, 1256 (2006) ...

32

Dept. of Health and Weffare v. Housel,
140 Idaho 96, JOO, 90 P.3d 321, 325 (2004).................................................

28

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Fannie Afae, v. Gary R. and
Linda L. Apel, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 31760, 2006
Opinion 1Vo. 61. .................. .......................................... ..............................

23

Garren v. Saccomanno, 86 Idaho 268, 385 P.2d 396 (1963). ................................

28

Hoppe v. lvfcDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35, 644 P.2d 355, 357 (1982)................. ........

5

Johnson v. Pioneer Title Co., ofAda County,
662 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Ct.App. 1983) ..........................

28

Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 162, 177 P.3d 372, 376 (2008) ...............

5

104 Idaho

1'..1eyers v. Hansen, Docket No. 35534, November 2009 (Idaho) .......................... 28, 33
Parkside Schools, Inc., v. Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics,
145ldaho176, 1

P.3d390(2008) ......................................................... ..

Page ii

Patton v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Phoenix,
1978). ...................................................................

23

Reinwald v. Eveland, 119 Idaho 111, 803 P.2d 1017 (Ct.App. 1991) .....................

16

Rodell v. Nelson, 113 Idaho 945, 750 P.2d 966 (Ct.App. 1988) ..............................

16

578 P.2d 152, 156

Security Pac[fic Finance Corp. v. Bishop,
109 Idaho 25, 28, 704 P.2d 357, 360 (1985) ................................................

23

Shelton v. Diamond Int'! Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 703 P.2d 699 (1985). ...................

30

Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 454, 180 P.3d 487, 493 (2008) ........

32

State v. Pratt, 128 Idaho 207,912 P.2d94 (1996) ................................................ ..

11

Trountner v. Kempthrone, l 42 Idaho 389, 391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006) .............

5

Tungsten Holdings, Inc., v. Drake, 143 Idaho 69, 72, 137 P.3d 456,459 (2006) ....

5

Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits,

135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132 (2000) ............................................

5

Wright v. Wright, 130 Idaho 918, 950 P. 2d 1257 (I 998) .... .... ....................... ........... 16
Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002) .............. 5

Constitution of the State of Idaho
Article I, section 1 ... .. .... ........... ... ...... ..... ........ .... ....... .... ........ ..... ...... ........ ...

19,

Article I, section 2 .. ... .... ..... .. ..... ... ....... ....................... ......... ... .. .... ... .... .. ... ...

11

Article I, section 13 ..................................................................................... 1
Article I, section 18 ........................................................................... 7, 1
Article 5, section 5 ......................................................................................

19, 32

18, 19,
10, 11

Constitution of the United States of America
1st Amendn1ent ........................................................................ ·......................

19, 32

6th An1endment ....... ... .... .... ... ... ..... ... .. ...... ............. .... .... ... .... ....... .... ... .. ........ 12, 19,
14th Amendment ........................................................................................... 12, 19, 32
Page iii

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule l(c)

18

Rule 7(b)(l)

26

Rule 7(b)(3)

3,27

Rule 7(b)(3)(A)...............................................................................................

26, 27

Rule 7(b)(3)(C)................................................................................................

26, 27

Rule 7(b)(3)(D)................................................................................................

27

Rule 7(b)(3)(E)................................................................................................

26, 27

Rule 7(b)(4)

25

Rule 1l(a)(l)

34

Rule 1l(b)

.............................................................................................. 2, 18, 25, 29

Rule 1 l(b)(l)

12,15,17

Rule 1 l(b)(2) ............................................................................................... .
Rule 60(b )( 1)

17
17,30

Rule 77(b)

2,6, 7

Idaho Appellate Rules

Rule 41(d)

...................................................................................................

4

Idaho Code

1-2005

................................................................................................... 9,10,11

45-1506

··································································································

45-1506A

................................................................................................. 21, 22, 23

22, 23

chapter 15 of title 45 ......................................................... 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 29, 30, 33
Code of Judicial Conduct.................................................................................

Cannon 2A

7

16

Cannon 3B(l) ...................................................................................................... .

Page iv

9

Statement of the Case.

Mark Pierson filed a complaint on behalf of Federal National Mortgage
Association on October 7th, 2009. A Bonner County Deputy Sheriff served the
Complaint upon Defendant David B. Allen on October 26th, 2009. Mr. Allen filed
a "Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss; Motion for Sanctions," on the grounds of lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of jurisdiction over the person, and
insufficiency of process. and set a hearing date for February 17th, 2010. Two and
half weeks later, on December 4th, 2009, Mr. Pierson filed the applications for
entry of default and default judgment on the grounds that Mr. Allen had failed to
file an answer to the complaint as required by law. On December 11th, 2009,
Default was ordered and judgment was entered awarding the plaintiff possession
of the property at 1596 E. Shingle Mill Road, Sandpoint, Bonner County, Idaho,
plus damages in the amount of $3,480.00, as well as attorney's fees and costs in
the amount of $498.00. On or about 27 December 2009 Mr. Perison, realizing his
and the Court's error, called Mr. Allen to work out a stipulation to set aside the
"default and default judgment." On January 21st, 2010 the parties filed a
stipulation to set aside "default and default judgment." Pursuant to that stipulation
an "Order" setting aside "default and default judgment" was issued on January 26,
2010.
On February 17th, 2010, Mr. Allen appeared and counsel for the Plaintiff
failed to appear. In fact, the hearing date somehow got undocketed without Notice
to Mr. Allen. Mr. Allen spoke with Judge Verby's secretary who stated that Judge
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Verby is in his office and he does not want to hear this today because he saw a
Notice of Substitution in the file. Please note that Mr. Allen had not received any
such notice. After much to-do Judge Verby's secretary re-scheduled to March 17th,
20 l O over the objection of Mr. Allen. This proved to the instance of prejudice to
Mr. Allen rights to due process.
On March 9th, 2010, Mr. O'Neill, who had no standing, filed a Notice of
Intent to Take Default, without having complied with the requirements for
substitution of attorneys as required under IRCP Rule 11 (b ). Said Notice was done
prior to the hearing on the Pre-Ansv,rer Motion by Mr. Allen filed on October 26th,
2009. On March 17th, 2010, a hearing was held on Mr. Allen's Motion to Dismiss
before someone other than the assigned to the case, Judge Yerby. Interloper, Judge
Charles Hosack denied the motion acting wholly without subject matter
jurisdiction or authority from the Chief Justice of the Idaho Supreme Court and/or
Administrative Judge of the District Court for the First Judicial District.
With the Motion to Dismiss still pending waiting to be heard before the
assigned District Court Judge, Judge Verby as per IRCP Rule 77(b), O'Neill who
himself had no standing in the case filed on April 5th, 2010 for Default and
Default judgment. On April 7th, 2010 the court entered an Order for Default and a
Default Judgment. Judge Verby being not present at the March 17th, 2010 hearing
was not aware of the issues surrounding Mr. O'Neill, who has no standing.
On April 14th, 2010, relying on the court rules that Judge Charles Hosack
was an Interloper on the case on March 17th, 2010, and that Mr. 0 1Neills filings
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had no standing due to non-eompliance with Rule 11 (b) of the IRCP, Mr. Allen
filed an Emergency Motion for Stay, Emergency Motion to Quash the Writ of
Ejectment, Motion to Vacate Judgment and an Answer and Counterclaim, which
were amended on the 20th of April, 2010.
April 21st, 2010, the hearing on the Emergency Motion for Stay,
Emergency Motion to Quash the Writ of Ejectment wherein Judge Yerby after
questioning Mr. O'Neill got O'Neill to admit that Mr. Allen never got personally
served with Notice of Sale, which was re-scheduled from March 2009, due to a
Stay which was placed upon Sun Trust Mortgage who supposedly held the "note."

In August of 2009 their council held a trustees sale without Notice being provided
to Mr. Allen, in which Sun Trust Mortgage sold the property to Fannie Mae \Vith
the documents of sale going back to Sun Trust Mortgage. It was not known to Mr.
Allen what had happened to the property at 1596

Shingle Mill Road, Sandpoint,

Bonner County, State of Idaho until he was served with the Complaint from
Fannie Mae.

At the conclusion of the hearing Judge Yerby took it under

advisement, in which it is still under advisement to this day as no final
determination was ever made. This is the next instance of prejudice to Mr. Allen.
The Motion to Vacate Judgment was noticed up for hearing to occur on the
9th day of June 2010. Judge Yerby instead of complying with IRCP Rule 7(b)(3)
decided the Motion without allowing the Plaintiff to respond to the :\1otion. On
June 9th, 2010 Mr. Allen appeared for the hearing as scheduled and again his
motion was undocketed without notice being provided to Mr. Allen. In addition,
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there was no counsel for the Plaintiff at the hearing that date either.

is the third time Mr., Allen was

Judgment which briefing period was still open

prejudiced by the court. On June 29th, 2010, Mr. O'Neill decided to respond to the
Motion to Vacate Judgment which was untimely.
filed a second Motion to Vacate

On July 2nd 2010, Mr. Allen

Judgment in response to the Order denying the Motion to Vacate Judgment which
said decision was plagued with erroneous findings of fact and law.
On July 21st, 2010 the hearing took place and Mr. O'Neill had not
responded to the Motion in writing. Judge Yerby did not decide any of the issues
raised within the brief, but did go into two issues. The first was the substitution
issue of Mr. O'Neill reciting a new standard outside of the strict compliance
standard this Court has maintained for the last 70 years. The second issue was
Judge Hosack's appearance on the case being lawful; when he knew Judge Hosack
did not have authority and was the final act of prejudice against ~1r. Allen.
Mr. Allen filed a Notice of Appeal with this Court.
Attorney's Fees

Appellant claims Attorney Fees pursuant to I.A.R. 41 (d) which states in
part to wit:

The claim for attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may
include paralegal fees shall be accompanied by an affidavit setting
forth the method of computation of the attorney fees claimed.
For a great part of this case the Appellant has secured the assistance of a
4 of35
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paralegal to do most of his \\-Titing, research, and preparation of oral arguments
before the court. Appellant asserts that should he prevail on Appeal he should be
able to get attorney fees for services as provided by the paralegal.
Argument with Questions Presented
It is a well settled principal of law that the issue of standing is jurisdictional

and may be raised at any time. Tungsten Holdings, Inc., v. Drake, 143 Idaho 69,
72, 137 P.3d 456, 459 (2006)(Because the issue of standing is jurisdictional, Van

Valkenburgh v. Citizens/or Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 124, 15 P.3d 1129, 1132
(2000), it may be raised at any time, Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35, 644
P.2d 355, 357 (1982).) See also Beach Lateral Water Users Association v.

Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 603, 130 P.3d 1138, 1141 (2006).
Further this Court has stated that because standing is jurisdictional and may
be raised at any time, including on appeal. Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158,
162, 177 P.3d 3 72, 3 76 (2008) citing Beach Lateral Water Users Association v.

Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 603, 130 P.3d 1138, 1141 (2006).
It is equally well settled principal of law that "Standing is a preliminary

question to be determined by this Court before reaching the merits of the case."

Trountner v. Kempthrone, 142 Idaho 389, 391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006) citing
Young v. City of Ketchum, 13 7 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002); as cited
in Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 707, 152 P.3d 575,
578 (2007).
There are three (3) questions of standing for this Court to review for error.
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1.

3.

Did Judge Hosack have standing to make determinations on this case
without complying with the Idaho Rules of Court or the processes Page
instituted by the Idaho Supreme Court?
Did Mr. O'Neill have standing to appear for the Plaintiff in this case
without proper compliance with the Idaho Court Rules on substitution?
Does Federal National Mortgage Association have standing to bring the
action without the compliance with the letter of the law under chapter 15
of Title 45 by SunTrust Mortgage?
There are two additional questions on appeal ancillary to the first three

which are:
4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

9.

Did the attorneys and the court comply with the Rules on Substitution of
attorneys? And
Was Judge Hosack's presence on the case in accordance with IRCP Rule
77(b) and the Idaho Supreme Court?
Did Judge Verby, the assi&,rned judge, abuse his discretion and violate
Defendant's due process and equal protection right in conjunction with the
first three issues on appeal?
Did Appellant receive due process of law and equal protection under the
law as provided for under the Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act - chapter 15 of
Title 45 Idaho Code?
Is the Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act - chapter 15 of Title 45 Idaho Code
constitutional in its application concerning in providing individuals who
are being foreclosed adequate protections under the provisions of state and
federal constitutions of due process and equal protection under the law?
Is it an abuse of discretion to avoid motions noticed up for hearing and
leave them undecided?
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 77(b) states in part to wit;
All trials or hearings of any court held before a judge or magistrate
assigned thereto, and all judgments and orders issued by such
courts shall be deemed to have been done in open court regardless
of the place held. IRCP Rule 77(b)
On November 16th the Defendant filed a Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss

which had a Notice of Hearing that this motion would be heard before the assigned
Judge of Steven Verby on February 1t\ 2010. See R 7 showing that Judge Verby
was assigned as Judge on this case.
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On February 1i\ 2010 the Defendant's motion was not scheduled on the
court's calendar, and Judge Yerby was present in chambers. Judge Yerby refused to
hear the motion to dismiss that day even though the parties and the Court were
properly notified of the hearing well in advance of the hearing date.
The Clerk of the Court re-scheduled the hearing to the 1th day of March,
2011 to Judge Yerby without a court record by an order or some other document
stating the reasons therefore. R 146. This act of not hearing the Motion as noticed
up for hearing on the 1th day of February, 2010 was prejudicial to the Defendant.

It was prejudicial to the Defendant as Defendant was present and ready to present
the merits of the Motion that day and there was no opposition to the motion filed
prior to the hearing on February 1th, 2010. 1
That delay was a denial of due process in violation of Section 18 of
Article I of the Constitution of the State of Idaho and was an abuse of discretion
by the trial court in violation to Idaho Rules of Court and Code of Judicial
Conduct which require mandatory compliance by the judge sitting on the bench.
On March 1t\ 2010, without prior notice of change of attorneys or that
the assigned judge would not be appearing, Judge Hosack appeared for Judge
Yerby in violation to IRCP Rule 77(b) and in absence of jurisdiction proceeded to
hear the Motion to Dismiss. Judge Hosack entered an Order of decision on the
Motion to Dismiss, R page 30.
On July 2, 2010, Appellant filed a second motion to vacate judgment. R
After the 17th day of February, 2010 on March 9th , 2010 a Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Sanctions was filed by an another attorney.
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121 - 127, Brief in Support of Motion to Vacate Judgment R 128 - 159. A Reply
Brief to Motion to Vacate Judgment R 160 - 164 which was filed on July 15 1\
2010 and are incorporated herein by their reference. The Notice of Hearing in the
Motion stated that the Motion was to be heard on July 21 51, 2010, before Judge
Steven Yerby, the assigned Judge to the case.
The Motion to Vacate Judgment specifically challenges the sufficiency of
Judge Hosack's appearance on the case at the March 1J1h hearing. R 130 - 133 The
Appellant incorporates these arguments in this appeal.
At the hearing Judge Yerby made the following findings on the issue of
Lack of jurisdiction of Judge Hosack. Tr. July 21 si, 2010 pages 13 and 14 to wit:
"THE COURT: At this time I'll Turn to the issue of lack of
jurisdiction of Judge Hosack.
Article 5 section 12 of the Idaho Constitution authorizes service
by retired judges providing that any retired District Judge may
hold a district court in any county at the request of the judge of the
district court thereof. I did make a request. I did request that Judge
Hosack handle cases while I was outside of the county.
Idaho Code section 1-2005 which governs the assignment and
duties and powers of senior judges provides that a senior judge is
eligible for temporary assignment by the state - - by the Supreme
Court to a state court as provided by this subsection whenever the
Supreme Court determines that the assignment is reasonably
necessary and will promote a more efficient administration of
justice. A senior judge may sit as district or magistrate judge of the
district court of the county.
(4) states that each senior judge assigned as provided in this
section has all the judicial powers and duties while serving under
the assignment of a regularly qualified judge of the court to which
the senior judge is assigned.
In State versus Lottridge, 29 Idaho 53, the court stated that there
can be no question that a district judge from one district may
preside in another district under certain circumstances. This is
apparent from the reading of the Constitutional provision. The
presumption is that a court of general jurisdiction has acted within
Page 8 of 35
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its jurisdiction. The presumption embraces another presumption
which in the absence of any affirmative showing in the record to
the contrary and that is that since an appropriate invitation, in this
case the law was older but it states from the judge of the district or
from the governor would have conferred the requisite authority
such invitation had been accepted.
The court went on to state, 'We therefore hold that the judgment
appealed from is not void for want of jurisdiction.'
So at this point I am going to deny the motion that has been filed
by Mr. Allen."
Tr. of the July 21st, 2010 hearing, pages 13 and 14.
Judge Hosack appeared on the case without having a valid assignment
from the Administrative District Court Judge - Judge Mitchell, as ordered by this
Court on December 15, 2009 by Chief Justice Eismann. See Affidavit of Stay in
Support of Motion For Stay, Exhibit - Order from Idaho Supreme Court In Re:
Assignment of; Senior Judge Charles W. Hosack and is incorporated herein by its
reference. Judge Hosack also violated the Code of judicial Conduct by presiding
over a case he was not assigned to pursuant to Canon 3B(l) which states to wit:
"B. Adjudicative Responsibilities.
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge
except those in which an appropriate disqualification is required by
these Canons." Code of Judicial Conduct

Judge Yerby stated on the record as transcribed herein that Judge Hosack
was properly clothed with authority; when Judge Yerby knew that he was not
pursuant to Idaho Code 1-2005(3). This section states to wit:
(3) The assignment of a senior judge shall be made by an order
which shall designate the court or duties to which the judge is
assigned and the duration of the assignment. Promptly after
assignment of a senior judge under this section, the Supreme Court
shall cause a certified copy of the order to be sent to the senior
Page 9 of 35
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judge and another certified copy to the court to which the judge is
assigned. Idaho Code Section 1-2005

It was a fact at the time when Judge Yerby announced his decision that
Judge Hosack was not clothed with authority due to the fact that the Chief Justice
of this Court through the Administrative Judge of the First Judicial District had not
issued the required Order of Assignment giving Judge Hosack authority to preside
over the above entitled case.
Further said lack of authority was known by Judge Yerby from the onset
due to the requirement pursuant to I.C. § 1-2005(3) that a copy of the Order be
sent to the Clerk of the Court to eventually be placed within the case file as stated
by Administrative Judge of the First Judicial District - Judge Mitchell stated in his
response to the Appellant's Public Record Request. See Affidavit of Stay in
Support of Motion For Stay, Exhibit - Request for Public Records requesting the
Order from Idaho Supreme Court In Re: Assignment of; Senior Judge Charles W.
Hosack and is incorporated herein by its reference. The bottom line is - no Order
exists which allowed Judge Hosack to preside over the above entitled case.
However, the extent of the deceit goes further than just the lack of the
Order and lying about it in open court. Judge Yerby's deliberate mis-stating the law
of Idaho Code § 1-2005 and Article Y, Section 12 of the Constitution of the State
of Idaho which continues to state to wit: "or of the chief justice, and when any

such request is made or approved by the chief justice it shall be his duty to do
so;" making it look like because he was out of the county was justification for not
following the process mandated by law, in which he had no business to be outside
Page 10 of 35
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of the county to begin with without an Order by this Court.
Judge Verby showed his disrespect for his immediate supervisors - the
Idaho Supreme Court Justices and his Employer, The People of this State, which I
am a member of pursuant to Section 2 of Article I of the Constitution for the State
of Idaho. Also he showed his bias and prejudice against the Appellant in violation
of Sixth Amendment of the Bill of Rights in not having a impartial judge as is also
required by Order of the Idaho Supreme Court of June 15 1'\ 2006

In Re: Policy

Regarding Fairness and Equality In the Courts and is incorporated herein by its
reference.
Additionally, this Court has recently stated in regards to both Article V,
Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho and Idaho Code § 1-2005 the
following quote from State v. Pratt, 128 Idaho 207, 912 P.2d 94 (1996) to wit:

"A retired district judge may hold a district court position upon
request and order of the chief justice." State v. Pratt, 128 Idaho
207,912 P.2d 94 (1996).

It should also be noted that this case is cited in the annotations of Article V,
Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho and Idaho Code § 1-2005 of
the Idaho Code. So Judge Verby should have had personal knowledge of what he
was mis-stating to interfere with the administration of justice and circumvent the
mandates of the law of this State and his superiors.
Again the bottom line is that the ruling made by Judge Hosack on the
Yl.otion to Dismiss is void ab initio for lack of standing of no authority to preside
on over the above entitled case. Judge Verby allowing Judge Hosack to interfere
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with his case assigned to him and his failure to correct the situation was an abuse
of discretion where no discretion existed as required by law.
Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is an undecided issue, in which the
Plaintiff could have never received a default judgment. Therefore said ruling on
the Motion to Dismiss and the Judgment of default constitutes fundamental error
as it is prejudicial to the Appellant in violation of his due process rights including
but not limited to Section 13 and 18 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of
Idaho, the 6 th and 14 th Amendment of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the
United states of America of as it took his property without due process of law.
Appellant also asserts that the decision of either Judge Hosack or Judge
Yerby to allow Judge Hosack to preside over the case was not a discretionary act
as stated herein. As such, Judge Hosack was not clothed with authority to preside
over this case and Judge Yerby failed to correct this error brought to his attention
of Judge Hosack's lack of standing to be on the case, who is also subject to Code
of Judicial Conduct.

Substitution Issue of Attornevs:
While the judges aforementioned indiscretions of Idaho Supreme Court
mandates and decisions was compounded by another deliberate lack of standing
and due process being implemented by a lack of compliance with procedural rules
concerning change of attorneys.
The initial complaint was filed on October

i\ 2009, by Mark D. Perison.

See R. pages 7 - 12. In the complaint it alleges throughout the complaint that the
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Plaintiff complied with the mandates of chapter 15 of Title 45. Appellant on
November 9t\ 2009 filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon partially on the lack of
standing of Plaintiff due to the non-compliance with chapter 15 of Title 45. See R
13 - 20. Before the Motion being heard a default judgment and judgment was
entered on December 11, 2009. See R. 21 - 25. On January 26 1'\ 2010 the default
judgment and judgment was set aside. See R. 26 - 27. Prior to all this, Appellant
sent a letter, R 71 -

and had phone conversations with Mr. Perison.

that

his "client" failed to disclose the truth about the real facts of this case surrounding
the fraudulent loan and the subsequent acts and actions of theft to make the
Appellant and his family homeless under color of law.
Based upon the September letter and the conversations with Mr. Pierson,
Mr. Pierson had full knowledge that he had no standing to bring the suit forward
and agreed to vacate the default judgment and judgment to avoid liabilities
accruing on his person. Additionally, On March 2nd , 2010 he sent a letter to
Appellant with an unsigned Notice of Substitution. See R. 108

111. Please Take

Judicial Notice of R. 110 and 111 of the fact that Mr. O'Niell's signature is not on
the Notice of Substitution.
IRCP Rule ll(b)(l) - (4) governs changes of attorneys. Rule ll(b)(l).
Change of attorneys - which states to wit:
The attorney of record of a party to an action may be changed or a
new attorney substituted by notice to the court and to all parties
signed by both the withdrawing attorney and the new attorney
without first obtaining leave of the court. If a new attorney appears
in an action, the action shall proceed in all respects as though the
new attorney of record had initially appeared for such party, unless
Page 13 of 35
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the court finds good cause for delay of the proceedings. I.R.C.P.
Rule 11 (b )(1) [Emphasis Added]
Looking at the Notice of Substitution in R. 110 and 111, both attorneys did not
sign the Notice. Whether or not the court record shows something other than what
the Appellant received is irrelevant. Notice must be provided to all parties signed
by both the withdrawing attorney and the new attorney. This simply was not done.
Each hearing the Appellant objected to Mr. O'Neill's appearance in the
above entitled case. See Tr. March 1?1\ 2010, pages 3 lines 21
1, and page 4 - lines 20
lines

25 page 4 - line

25, page 5 - lines 1 - 19, page 6- lines 4

22, page 7 -

and page 8 - lines 1 - 23, page 9 - lines 1 - 25 and page 10 - lines 1 -

13; Tr. April 21 , 2010, page 6 - lines 22 - 25 and page 7 - lines I
lines 11

19; page 8

page 4 - lines 1

5; page 7 -

lines 4- 15; Tr. July 21 5\ 2010, page 3 - lines 19

25 and

17.

At the July 21 51, 2010 hearing Judge Yerby addressed two issues of many
issues raised in

Motions to Vacate Judgment. The Second issue was Judge

Hosack being on the case which Appellant has already discussed. The First issue is
the substitution of attorneys. Judge Yerby made the following findings on page
pages 11 and 12 of the Tr. July 21 st , 2010, to wit:
THE COURT: I am going to address the two new issues that have
been raised. One is the lack of standing of plaintiffs counsel Mr.
O':-,'eill due to improper substitution. And when I say new, I relate
to additional information that has been presented.
The omission of the withdrawing counsel Mark Pierson's
signature on the Notice of Substitution of counsel is not
necessarily grounds for nullification of present counsel Mr.
O'Neill's action in this case because Mr. Allen has failed to show
that he was misled or otherwise prejudiced by the substitution.
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 11 (b )(1) which does govern a
change of substitution of attorneys provides that all parties must - excuse me, the substitution must be signed by both the
withdrawing attorney and the new attorney without first obtaining
leave of the court. Courts in other jurisdictions have held that an
irregularity in substitution does not oust jurisdiction or require
validation of the substituting attorney's actions where no prejudice
has been sho\\-11 by the opposing party.
For example, in California Appellate Court Baker versus Box
226 Cal Appeals 3d 1303 stated "Where the actual authority of the
new or different attorney appears, courts regularly excuse the
absence of record of a formal substitution and validate the
attorney's acts, particularly where the adverse party has not been
misled or otherwise prejudiced."
In a New York State appellate case, Divalackwa (phonetic
spelling) versus Bloomberg LP., 895 Kew York 2d 347, a Kew
York Appeals Division, First Department 2010 case, the holding
was made that plaintiffs mistake of not filing the consent to
change form is under the circUillstances a mere formality and
Quincy has shown no prejudice by the plaintiffs noncompliance
with the applicable rule.
In Black versus Ameritel Inns, 139 Idaho 511, 2003 Idaho
Supreme Court case, although not dealing directly on point with
this issue, the Court did interpret Rule 11 and stated that Rule 11 is
not intended to be a stumbling block to the pursuit of justice. The
primary goal in the application of Rule 11 is to deter pleading and
motion abuses.
In these circumstances, there has not been a showing that there
has been prejudice by the substitution so it is the Court's ruling that
the substitution, although not completely in compliance - " Tr.
July 21 81, 2010 pages 11 and 12
First Judge Verby admitted that counsel did not comply with IRCP Rule
11 (b )(l ). Next there was no consideration given to the fact that Appellant objected
to each of Mr. O'Keill's appearances and that Mr. O'Neill could have rectified the
situation by complying with IRCP Rule ll(b)(l) by providing a Notice of
Substitution with signatures of the withdrawing party and the new attorney. Why
Mr. O'Neill chose not to do so is a question for him to answer, but the Appellant
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will not speculate.
But what is well settled is the law and this Court and Court of Appeals of
the State of Idaho has stated multiple times in Rodell v. Nelson, 113 Idaho 945,
750 P.2d 966 (Ct.App. 1988) holding that "Strict compliance with this rule is
reasonable and necessary in light of the rule's extraordinary impact." And again in
Reinwald v. Eveland, 119 Idaho 111, 803 P.2d 1017 (Ct.App. 1991) holding that

"Strict compliance, and not substantial compliance, is required when the rule is
applicable." And by this Court in the case of Wright v. Wright, 130 Idaho 918, 950
P.2d 1257 (1998) in which this Court held, "There must be strict compliance with
this rule to obtain a valid judgment. Judgments obtained without such compliance
are void."
Judge Yerby in error introduced new standards not known to the current
standard of strict compliance in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
2 A which states to wit: "Judges should respect and comply with the law and
should conduct themselves at all times in a manner that does not detract from
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." "Law" denotes
court rules as well as statutes, constitutional provisions and decisional law. Code
of Judicial Conduct.
The case of Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571,212 P.3d 1001 (2009), wherein
recently this Court again upheld the strict compliance standard holding that,
"Strict compliance with the rule is required to obtain a valid judgment. However,
where a party fails to demonstrate pr~judice stemming from alleged inadequate
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notice of a hearing on his attorney's motion to withdraw, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 60(b )( 1) motion for relief"
The facts in Berg are different from the facts in this case. Berg's attorney
for a minor child failed to properly give notice to Berg's father pursuant to IRCP
Rule ll(b)(3), and later the mother filed a motion to vacate the dismissal, which
was subsequently appealed. In this case it was opposing counsel who failed to give
proper notice to Appellant pursuant to IRCP Rule 11 (b )(1 ). Further, in this matter
there was no hearing on the issue, which is required under IRCP Rule 11 (b )(2),
which in itself was pr~judicial to the Appellant. This prejudice was known to
Judge Yerby in the record due to Judge Yerby's direct interference with Appellant's
due process rights of having the plaintiff show good cause for the change and the
delay which resulted in the disposition of the Motion to Dismiss which was
noticed up for hearing on February l 7t\ 2010. Judge Yerby decided NOT to hear
the Motion to Dismiss on the docket due to supposed change of attorneys.
Further prejudice can be sho\\n in the record where Judge Yerby allowed
another Judge to interlope on his case without any apparent authority who had no
obligation to uphold the law and rights of the Appellant. These were the first three
(3) prejudices which were known by Judge Verby at the time of his decision and
would not let the Appellant respond to his newly discovered standard in
derogation to this Court's mandated law of strict compliance which has been in
existence of over ten ( 10) years.
Judge Yerby introduced a clearly erroneous standard by shifting the burden
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of proof of plaintiff demonstrating strict compliance of IRCP Rule 11 (b) to having
the Appellant prove prejudice without giving him the opportunity to do so. Judge
Yerby does not cite any Idaho cases on point to substantiate his findings, but cite
cases from outside the jurisdiction of the State ofidaho which are not applicable to
State of Idaho case rulings (law) or the rules of court (law) all of which is another
prejudice to the Appellant.
It is also worthy to note that the issue of substitution was not a matter of

discretion pursuant to IRCP Rule 1(c) which states in part, "No district court or
magistrates division of the state shall make rules of procedure except as expressly
authorized by these rules."
Another showing of prejudice was Judge Verby's failure to uphold the
decisions of this Court on the doctrine of Strict Compliance with Rule 11 and issue
a decision in favor of the Appellant as was required to be in confom1ity with the
law and as is required under Article I, Section 18, entitled, "Justice to be freely
and speedily administered." which states to wit:
"Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy
remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or character,
and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial,
delay, or prejudice."
The ultimate showing of prejudice was when Judge Yerby failed to vacate
the entry of default judgment and judgment, R 32 - 35, handed to Mr. O'Neill
when Mr. O"N eill lacks standing to be on the case. See Brief on Second Motion to
Vacate Judgment pages 5 - 9 as R. 132 - 136 and are incorporated herein by its
reference. Decisions to allow Mr. O'Neill, who had no standing, to be on the case,
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due to lack of compliance with IRCP Rule 11 (b) was an abuse of discretion, in
opposition to Rules of court and case dicta, in which this Court should reverse.
Does Federal National Mortgage Association have standing?

This issue of Fannie Mae's lack of standing was brought each time
Appellant went before the Court without determination of the subject matter after
Appellant's presentation. See Tr. March 1i\ 2010, page 26 - lines 7 - 25, page 27
- lines 1 - 8 and 17 - 25, page 28 - lines 1 - 4; Tr. April 21 sr, 2010 pages 8-11, 14
- 24; Tr. July 21 sr, 2010, pages 6 - 10. In order for this Court to fully understand
the issue on appeal, Appellant requests the Court to TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE of
the Answer and Counterclaim in record as R. 49 - 81, which details and
demonstrates the non-compliance with chapter 15 of title 45 Idaho code.
The door was opened by the Plaintiff's complaint to challenge the
sufficiency of the non-judicial foreclosure processes used to secure the property
from Appellant as alleged in the complaint in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7. See R. pages
7 - 12.
Judge Hosack not having any standing to preside over the case, made no
legitimate opinions which had any legal effect, except to deprive Appellant of a
fair and impartial hearing, in violation of the 1st• 6th and 14th Amendments of the
Bill of Rights to the Constitution of the United States of An1erica and Sections 13
and 18 of Article I of the Constitution of the State ofldaho.
Second, constitutionality of the Non-judicial Foreclosure Act codified in
Idaho Code as Chapter 15 of Title 45 was brought into question before the court
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on July 21 s1, 2010 which was never detem1ined. Tr. July 21 sr, 2010, page 4 - lines
4 - 22 which the Appellant stated to wit:
All right. First, in order for Fannie Mae to be the plaintiff:~ the transaction
which led up to this obtaining an interest had to be lawful and legal. As a matter
of standing concerning how

Mae was supposedly deeded Appellant's

property is alleged in the complaint to be through the Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act
of chapter 15 of Title 45, Idaho Code. At the March 1i\ 2010 hearing before
Judge Hosack, who had no authority to be presiding anyway, Appellant brought
the issue forward as the transcript shows on page 17
pages 26, 27, and 28

lines 1

lines 10 - 25 and again

4 all explaining the lack of compliance with the

Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act.
Due to Judge Hosack not being clothed with authority to preside on the
bench, he was not under any obligation to consider the merits of the jurisdictional
challenge to plaintiff's complaint which failed to recite a jurisdictional clause for
bringing forth the action, other than clauses VI and VII within the complaint itself.
R. pages 7-12 at 9. Judge Hosack failed to act in accordance with the law to the
prejudice of the Appellant. That failure consisted of not deciding a standing issue
which can be brought at any time, with or without notice to the other side. See the
cases on standing as stated on page 5 herein.
At the April 21 st hearing the issue of standing came forward again by the
Appellant. In the Appellant's Answer and Counterclaim, R. pages 49

81 and First

Motion to Vacate Judgment, R 46 - 48 and Brief in Support of Motion, R. 36 -45,
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and are incorporated herein by its reference, it was fully demonstrated that the
Plaintiff had no standing for noncompliance with chapter 15 of Title 45 Idaho
Code

Nonjudicial Forclosure Act. See R. pages 49

81 at

54 with attached

Exhibits. Appellant asserted at the hearing of April 21st, 2010, before the assigned
judge

Judge Yerby, that there was no service on the Appellant of the Notice of

Sale for August of 2010. Tr. April 21 51, 2010, pages 8

lines 16

25, 9, IO- lines

1 -21, 11 - lines 4 - 9.
Based on the foregoing, Judge Yerby explored the claims of the Appellant.
April 21 5\ 2010, pages 17 - 22. In the direct questioning of Judge Yerby about
whether or not the Appellant received actual notice of the second sale date Mr.
O'Neill stated, "Your Honor, ifl might. I need to go back. He doesn't Have to have
actual knowledge of that exact sale." This statement is contrary to Idaho Code §
45-1506A.
Judge Yerby also questioned Mr. O'Neill about the lack of proper posting
with the proposed sale. In conclusion Judge Yerby stated, "So if the - - if the
Notice of Publication lists the wTong property and the Affidavit of Posting posted
the wrong property, is it possible that Mr. Allen may have a legitimate position?
Idaho Code § 45-l 506A which states to wit:
45-1506A.Rescheduled sale -- Original sale barred by stay
Notice of rescheduled sale. (1) In the event a sale cannot be held at
the time scheduled by reason of automatic stay provisions of the
U.S. bankruptcy code (11 U.S.C. 362), or a stay order issued by
any court of competent jurisdiction, then the sale may be
rescheduled and conducted follO\ving expiration or termination of
the effect of the stay in the manner provided in this section.
(2) Notice of the rescheduled sale shall be given at least thirtv
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(30) days before the day of the rescheduled sale bv registered or
certified mail to the last known address of all persons who were
entitled to notice by mail of the original sale and to anv person
who shall have recorded a request for notice of sale at least
fortv-five (45) days prior to the rescheduled sale date in the
form and manner required by section 45-1511, Idaho Code,
provided that recording the request prior to notice of default is,
for the purposes of this section only, waived.
(3) Notice of the rescheduled sale shall be published in the
newspaper of original publication once a week for three (3)
successive weeks, making three (3) publishings in all, with the
last publication to be at least ten (10) days prior to the dav of
sale.
(4) The trustee shall make an affidavit stating that he or she
has complied with subsections (2) and (3) of this section. The
trustee shall make the above affidavit available for inspection
at the time of the rescheduled sale together with any affidavit of
mailing and posting, when required, which was not of record as
required bv subsection (7) of section 45-1506, Idaho Code,
when the stav became effective. The affidavit or affidavits shall
be attached to or incorporated in the trustee's deed. [Emphasis
Added] LC. § 45-1506A

What Mr. O'Neill's stance was, if he had standing to bring forth any
arguments in the first place, was his reliance on the first date for trustee sale,
which he admitted was stayed by the bankruptcy court and that they continued to
use the same affidavit of service and notice documents for the second date which
were as equally defective in the first date set for trustee's sale. Tr. April 21 sr, 2010,
pages 17 - 23.
The requirements of rescheduling a trustee's sale from the termination of a
automatic stay of Appellant's property, failed to comply with the standards in
subsections 2, 3, 4 of LC. § 45-1506A for any alleged second date set for trustee's
sale, not to mention that there was non-compliance with LC. 45-1506 subsections
5, 6, 7, and 10 either on the staid first date for trustee's sale.
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What all this comes down to is that the Appellant did not receive A:'-JY due
process and equal protection rights whatsoever under the Nonjudicial Foreclosure
Act - chapter 15 of Title 45 Idaho Code.
The Appellant brought to the attention of Judge Yerby the case Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Fannie _Mae, v. Gary R. and Linda L. Apel,
Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 31760, 2006 Opinion No. 61. See R. pages 62 -

70 as Exhibit B to the Answer and Counterclaim. Looking at the Apel decision on
page 67 of the Clerk's transcript clearly shows that strict compliance with the
notice provisions are required under I.C. 45-1506 and I.C. 45-1506A were not
complied with. Security Pacific Finance Corp. v. Bishop, 109 Idaho 25, 28, 704
P.2d 357, 360 (1985)(quoting Patton v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of
Phoenix, 578 P.2d 152, 156 (Ariz. 1978).

Having not complied with the strict requirements of LC. 45-1506 and I.C.
45-1506A as demonstrated by Judge Yerby's questioning of Mr. O'Neill and the
Exhibits cited in plaintift's complaint showed a lack of standing of the Plaintiff in
which Plaintiff could not have received title to the property because SunTrust
Mortgage could never have had title to the property because Panhandle State
Bank, the originator of the "loan" sold the promissory note prior to selling the
"loan" to SunTrust Mortgage. So, there is no proper chain of title in existence to
the Plaintiff There is also the fact that MERS had no interest to transfer.
Judge Yerby having personal knowledge of the fact that Appellant never
received Notice of Sale or had been served with anything to indicate that Appellant
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had actual knowledge of the second trustee's sale date, which was proof that the
Plaintiff had no standing in the case, was fundamental error by the court to first
protect the Appellant's property rights and second failed to even enter into the
record a determination on the issue raised and proved by Judge Yerby himself.

It is also worth mentioning that the Motions noticed up for hearing on
April, 21 sr, 2010 was for an Emergency Motion to Quash the Writ of Ej ectment
and Emergency Motion for Stay, with the Motion to Vacate Judgment scheduled
for hearing on June 9t\ 2010. See Notice of Hearing contained in aforementioned
Motions R. page 84, 86, and 47 respectfully. See also Tr. April 21st, 2010, page 3 lines 1 - 2. Arguments on the two Emergency motions for Stay and Quash the Writ
of Ejectment were presented fully to the court. On page 29 -lines 18 - 20 of the
April 21 st transcript of the hearing Judge Yerby concluded the hearing by taking
the matters under advisement.
Also having the Brief to the Motion to Vacate judgment which also
included the Answer and Counterclaim prior to the hearing of April 21 sr, 2010 gave
Judge Yerby additional evidences and personal knowledge of the violations of
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act - Chapter 15 of Title 45, Idaho Code. The Apel
decision included also gave Judge Yerby knowledge of the fact that Strict
Compliance to the Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act was required in order to satisfy due
process mandates. To date no determinations were made on these two issues
brought timely by the Appellant to the detriment and prejudice of Appellant's
rights in the property under litigation.
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In addition, since Mr. O'Neill was appearing telephonically the court was
obligated to send to me minutes to be prepared, filed and served upon all parties
pursuant to IRCP Rule 7(b)(4). This did not happen until much later down the road
without request by the Appellant. Whether the Appellant suffered prejudice from
the lack of not having the minutes is undetermined by the Appellant as there were
other more prejudicial issues going on due to lack of determinations being made
by the court.
However, due to Judge Hosack's unauthorized interference in the case the
Appellant had no choice but to also file a Motion to Vacate Judgment and an
Answer and Counterclaim on Plaintiffs claims even though the Plaintiff lacked
standing to bring the suit. See R. pages 49 - 81.
In the Answer and Counterclaim Appellant raised multiple affirmative
defenses and claims multiple issues of fraud and fraud upon the court. In the April
21 st hearing Appellant also raised multiple issues of fraud upon the court, which
were left unanswered by Mr. O'Neill and the court. The issue of standing of Judge
Hosack and whether his determination made on the Motion to Dismiss is a core
issue to this Appeal. Just as important is whether Mr. O'Neill has standing on the
case even though there exists a lack of strict compliance with Rule ll(b) of the
IRCP, which would preclude Mr. O'Neill the ability to submit anything into the
court record let alone file for default judgment.
As far as the Appellant is concerned they have no standing not just because
they failed to comply with the Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, but also because they

Page 25 of 35
Appellant's First Brief

had other remedies which had to be acted on before an action to take Appellant's
propeny matured. Appellant paid mongage insurance in the event that Appellant
defaulted on the "loan." Did the Plaintiff file a claim to the insurance company to
get the alleged monies due them? I doubt it. But they were required to. That's a
contractual lack of standing to sue or is the insurance payments the Appellant paid
just another fraud committed against the Appellant.
First Motion to Vacate

Appellant incorporates all proceeding paragraphs prior to the Motion to
vacate Judgment. The Motion to vacate Judgment was filed in accordance with
IRCP Rule 7(b)(3)(C) and a brief was filed at the same time the motion was filed
on April 14 1\ 2010. See Tr. pages 46 - 48 and 36 - 45, respectfully. This motion
had a hearing date of June 91\ 2010. See Notice of Hearing as contained in the
Motion to Vacate Judgment. Tr. pages 46 - 48. The Notice of Hearing is required
under IRCP Rule 7(b )(1) and 7(b )(3 )(A) so that it can be determined the timeliness
of briefing with the time periods required to file responses and reply briefing
pursuant to IRCP Rule 7(b )(3)(E).
With the hearing date being set for the 9 th day of June, 2010, Plaintiff had
up to June 2nd to file a response to the Motion. However, Judge Yerby entered his
decision on May 2i\ 2010 - 6 days prior to Plaintiffs time to file their response.
Appellant asserts that because of what occurred on April 21 si, 2010 hearing, Judge
Yerby knew that Mr. O'Neill had no standing to respond to the Motion to Vacate
Judgment and also it was known to him that Plaintiff had no standing to bring forth
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the action filed. In any event, due process was not satisfied as to the mandates of
IRCP Rule 7(B)(3).
In the case of Parkside Schools, Inc., i: Bronco Elite Arts & Athletics, 145
Idaho 176, 177 P.3d 390 (2008) this Court explained the requirements under IRCP
Rule 7(b)(3)(A) & (C). Three days after Parkside's motion to dismiss was served,
the court granted the motion via an order apparently prepared by Parkside. In
doing so, the district court exceeded its authority. IRCP Rule 7(b)(3)(D) which
provides that "If the moving party does not request oral argument upon the motion,
and does not file a brief within fourteen (14) days, the court may deny such motion
without notice if the court deems the motion has no merit." The rule provides
authority to deny a motion under specified circumstances. It does not give the
court authority to grant a motion, nor does it excuse compliance with IRCP Rule
7(b)(3)(A) & (C). Thus, the district court acted in excess of its authority in
granting the motion. We therefore vacate the order. Parkside supra.
This case applies to this case in that the court knew a brief had been filed
and oral argument was not being requested and that a hearing date was definitely
set for June 9th , 2010. The district court order R. pages 87

94 does not find that

the Appellant's Motion to Vacate Judgment had no merit and therefore the district
court's order was issued in excess of its authority and in derogation with the IRCP
Rule 1( c) which specifies that no judge can make any rules of procedure except as
expressly authorized by these rules. It was not a matter of discretion to comply
with IRCP Rule 7(b )(3) in its entirety. Further, because the IRCP Rules are adopted
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by Coun Order from this Comi it was also an act of Contempt. Fmiher, Appellant
objected to the comt's premature order by filing a reply brief on June 41\ 2010, R.
pages 95 - 99 and Affidavit R. pages 99 - 100.
In the Motion itself Appellant cited that "Judgments by default are not

favored and, generally, the Coun is to grant relief from default order to reach a
judgment on the merits. Johnson v. Pioneer Title Co., of Ada County, 104 Idaho
727, 732, 662 P.2d 1171, 1176 (Ct.App. 1983). Because judgments of default are
not favored, a trial court should grant relief in doubtful cases in order to decide the
case on the merits. Garren v. Saccomanno, 86 Idaho 268, 385 P.2d 396 (1963).
By this point there was:
1) a judge who interfered with another judges case and acting without any
authority by Court Order from the Chief Justice or the Administrative Judge. Judge
Hosack was informed by this Court of the conditions for him to preside over any
case and knew before he presided over this case, that he had no authority. That
such action(s) by Judge Hosack was void ab initio, leaving Appellant's motion to
dismiss undecided in conformity with case decision. Meyers v. Hansen, Docket
No. 35534, November 2009 (Idaho)(However a judgment is also void if the court's action amounts to plain usurpation of power constituting a violation of due
process. Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 90 P.3d 321,
325 (2004 ). A reasonable prudent person would not be expected to be held to a
ruling in which the one sitting on the bench lacked subject matter jurisdiction and
who had no authority to preside on;
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2) An attorney not properly substituted in derogation with strict compliance
requirements ofIRCP Rule ll(b) and case decisions from this Court. A reasonable
prudent person would not be expected to be held to counsel who was not properly
substituted in confonnity with the court rule and decisional law and in which case
law expressly stated that the Appellant had no duty or obligation to perform on
filings done by counsel not properly substituted;
3) Docketed

presented to the court on April 21 51, 2010, which was

left undecided. Even though there was substantial evidence of noncompliance with
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act

chapter 15 of Title 45, Idaho Code. A reasonable

prudent person would not be expected to be held to a nonjudicial foresclosure sale
when he did not receive service of Notice of pending sale in conformity with
chapter 15 of Title 45 Idaho Code.
and,
4) Judge Verby who had in his possession:
a) the Apel case stated that that statute required strict compliance to satisfy
due process;
b) the documents showing noncompliance,
c) statements from O'Neill that admitted non-compliance; and
d) Judge Verby himself coming to the conclusion that Appellant had
meritorious issues concerning the non compliance with Nonjudicial Foreclosure
Act

chapter 15 of Title 45, Idaho Code. And the record so shows. A reasonable

prudent person would expect a constitutional court to be in session which has a
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judge properly authorized to preside over a case. Would expect the court not to lie
to him on the record with full knowledge. Would expect to have his remedies
granted to him without prejudice, delay, etc., pursuant to Section 18 of Article 1 of
the Constitution of the State of Idaho. None happened. Why?
None of these deficiencies as the record shows and by law were acts and
actions of discretion. By their acts and actions they were done in abuse of
discretion by emanating decisions which were erroneous from the facts presented,
especially at the April 21st, 2010 hearing when O'Neill admitted that Appellant did
not have actual notice by service in conformity with the Nonjudicial Foreclosure
Act - chapter 15 of Title 45 Idaho Code, all being in derogation to the Code of
Judicial Conduct, court rules, case law, State and National Constitutions, etc., and
the standard of the criteria used by reviewing courts on a motion under IRCP Rule
60(b)(1) as cited in Shelton v. Diamond Int'! Corp., l 08 Idaho 935, 703 P.2d 699
(1985).
In accordance with Johnson and Garren decisional law and as
demonstrated by and through substantial evidence from Appellant not receiving
constitutional due process or equal protection pursuant to statute, rule, case
decision, etc., in this case this is a doubtful case which entitled Appellant to have
the default vacated and decided on its merits in conformity with decisional law of
Johnson and Garren, supra. See also Baldwin v. Baldwin, 114 Idaho 525, 757 P.2d
1244 (Ct.App. 1988).
It is also worthy to note that Mr. O'Neill filed an Objection to the Motion to
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Vacate Judgment on June 29 1\ 2010, some 27 days late from the hearing date of
June 91\ 2010 in conjunction with the requirements ofIRCP Rule 7(b)(3)(E). See
R. pages 118 - 120.

The reason(s) for denying the Motion to Vacate was in error. Primarily,
alleging that in order to place facts before the court in a Motion to Vacate requires
an affidavit. That since there was no facts properly placed by affidavit Appellant
had a lack of proof to substantiate excusable neglect, fraud, and fraud upon the
court asserted in the Motion to Vacate Judgment.
Second Motion to Vacate Judgment

Appellant filed another Motion to Vacate Judgment on July 2nd , 2010. See
R. 121 - 127; Brief in Support of Motion, R. pages 159; Reply Brief, R. pages 160
-164 all addressing the reasoning for the denial of the first Motion to Vacate
Judgment. Appellant re-asserts his briefings in both motions to vacate judgment
and are incorporated herein by its reference. With all the issues he raised in the
Order denying the First Motion to Vacate Judgment, which was clearly set out in
the second brief challenging the ruling, none of the issues raised in the second
Motion to Vacate Judgment was ever decided by Judge Yerby. He threw his hands
in the air and vacated the bench without so much as to comment.
The two issues he did address at the July 21 si, 2010 hearing was
Substitution and How Judge Hosack had supposed authority to preside on this
case, which has been fully debunked. In other words Judge Yerby lied on the
record in open court. He knew he was lying because there was no Order placed in
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the case file showing that Judge Hosack had permission from the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court or from the Administrative Judge of the First Judicial District
as per the Order from the Chief Justice himself.
One

raised and not decided was the Appellant challenged the process

under the Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act - chapter 15 of Title 45 Idaho Code to be
unconstitutional on the grounds for violating the due process clauses of the
Constitution of the State of Idaho - sections 1, 13, 18 of Article 1 and the
Constitution of the United States of America in the 1st, 6th, and 14th amendments
- in that legal rights to propeny are subjected to being taken without the person
affected thereby by the foreclosure has no ability to challenge or defend his
property rights before his property rights are affected due to the lack of the statute
providing a mechanism for the individual who is about to be foreclosed to secure
minimal requirements of due process of notice of hearing and the right to be heard.
The Idaho Supreme Court stated in a recent decision to wit, "Procedural
due process requires that there must be some process to ensure that the individual
is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state and federal
constitutions." Cmvan v. Board ofComm'rs, 143 Idaho 501,510, 148 P.3d 1247,
1256 (2006); "An individual must be provided with notice and an opportunity to
be heard." Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 454, 180 P.3d 487, 493
(2008); Due process is not a rigid concept. Instead, the protections and safeguards
necessary vary according to the situation. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v.

Piper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 (1999). cited from Meyers v. Hansen,
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Docket No. 35534, November 2009 (Idaho).
Because there is a lack of due process complying with minimal standards
as set forth in the Meyers v. Hansen, Docket No. 35534, November 2009 (Idaho)
decision, the Court has an extra duty bestowed upon it, to ensure that statutory
process was strictly complied with under Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act chapter 15
of Title 45 Idaho Code. There was not compliance with the Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Act chapter 15 of Title 45 Idaho Code in this case. Even Judge Yerby
himself acknowledged the possibility of noncompliance with Nonjudicial
Foreclosure Act - chapter 15 of Title 45 Idaho Code though he failed to act.
As such, the Appellant believes that since there are not adequate safeguards
in place to ensure the constitutional protection of life, liberty, property and pursuit
of happiness as stated in Section 1 of Article of the Constitution of the State of
Idaho. At the July 21st hearing Appellant raised the question of constitutionality of
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act - chapter 15 of Title 45 Idaho Code. See

July 21st

hearing - page 6 lines 4
In error., Judge Yerby left this question of constitutionality undetermined
and Appellant asserts that this Court must decide and declare the statute
unconstitutional upon its face as has many other states which have similar statutes
which have recently come under scrutiny.
Another issue not really germaine to the subject matter was Judge Yerby
raising the issue that Appellant failed to show proof of his disability even though at
each hearing Appellant noticed the court of his disabilities. Tr. March 17th, 2010,
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page 4 - lines 4 - 10 and 15 - 18, page 8 lines 24 and 25. Tr. April 21st, 2010, page
4 - lines I 8 - 25, page 5 - lines 1 - 12, page 10 24 and 25 and page 11 lines 1 - 3
and 12 - 25 and page 12 - lines 1 - 7; page 26 - lines 1 - 4; page 29 - lines 12 - 17.
Tr. July 21st, 2010, page 4 - lines 1 - 3. Besides all the times he mentioned his
disabilities and medical problems, Appellant also had his prescription pill bottles
on the table in full view of the bench. Also, on July 2nd Appellant provided in an
affidavit letters from the VA and Dr Haugen emphasizing that Appellant was
disabled and on morphine for pain. R. pages 114 and 115, in an effort to have
Judge Yerby change his erroneous conclusions of fact in his determination to deny
the First Motion to Vacate Judgment. Did Judge Yerby take any action to correct
this inaccuracy of fact? - NO!
Another issue not really germane to the subject matter was Judge Verby's
pronouncement of a new system of motion practice for a Motion to Vacate
judgment requiring affidavits to show fact, when in IRCP Rule 11 (a)(l) it states as
clear as day to wit, "Except as otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute,
pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. Rule 60(b) does not
mandate that the motion must have an affidavit as other rules do. This issue was
briefed out in the Second Motion to Vacate Judgment, R. pages 128 - 159 at 136 141 and is incorporated herein by its reference. Did Judge Yerby take any action
to correct this inaccuracy of fact? - NO!
Every issue determined by Judge Yerby was met with opposition supported
by fact and law - all being documented. Did Judge Yerby take any action to correct
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this inaccuracy of fact? - NO[
Conclusion

Removing all the technicalities of presentation before this Honorable
Court, the pure facts in this case are that Judge Hosack had no standing to preside
on this case. Because he did not, the Motion to Dismiss remains undetermined.
Mr. O'Neill's failure to comply with the Rules on Substitution, now he will
undoubtedly use as an excuse for not providing Notice to Appellant that the Court
did. Therefore the Appellant did. Appellant objecting to Mr. O'Neills appearance at
every stage should be sufficient proof of fact the Appellant did not receive service.
Mr. O'Neill could have corrected the deficiency by just serving the Appellant with
proper Notice signed by both attorneys. He did not. However, if this Court alters
its long standing standard of strict compliance to something else, would be
prejudicial and detrimental to the Appellant in the loss of his home without any
concrete procedural due process whatsoever.
Coupled with all the various skull drudgery by the lower court, the
Appellant deserves the benefit of doubt and vacate the entry of default and default
judgment and allow the parties to prove their individual claims on the merits as
dictated by public policy of this State. The Appellant so prays.
Dated this

;:l

~ay of August, 2011.
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